Multiple Job Holding

Dual Job Holding by Public Sector Health Professionals in Highly Resource-Constrained Settings: Problem or Solution?

This paper examines the policy options for the regulation of dual job holding by medical professionals in highly resource-constrained settings. It draws on the limited evidence available on this topic to assess a number of regulatory options in relation to the objectives of quality of care and access to services, as well as some of the policy constraints that can undermine implementation in resource-poor settings. [from abstract]

Dual Practice by Public Health Providers in Shandong and Sichuan Provinces, China

There are four types of health providers at present in China. These are defined in terms of differences in ownership. Private practice in the health sector was reintroduced from 1980, when China began its economic reform from a planned economy to a market economy. Dual practice (DP) is quite common and a major concern from the point of view of health policy-making as little is known about it. The aim of this study was to describe policies and regulations of DP, the current situation, its impact on access to services and physician behaviour, and to provide evidence for future policy decisions. This study was conducted in two provinces, Shandong and Sichuan.

Dual Practice in the Health Sector: Review of the Evidence

This paper reports on income generation practices among civil servants in the health sector, with a particular emphasis on dual practice. It first approaches the subject of public-private overlap. Thereafter it focuses on coping strategies in general and then on dual practice in particular. In this paper dual practice is approached from six different perspectives: what is meant by dual practice; typology of dual practices; prevalence; impact on personal income, the health care system and health status; reasons; and possible interventions. [adapted from author]

Dual Practice of Public Sector Health Care Providers in Peru

To explore the extent, characteristics, incentives, effects and possible regulation of private medical practice in public facilities this study undertook a cross sectional quantitative – qualitative analysis. Results from the survey and focus groups reveal that DP is mainly a strategy to obtain better incomes in the face of low public salaries. Furthermore this situation is influenced by the Peruvian macroeconomic environment characterised by an oversupply of doctors caused by the deregulation medical practice and education. DP is common in all types of health facilities and working institutions, and it is closely associated to clinical practices.

Health Workforce

This issue focuses on the health workforce and contains the articles: Could health worker migration bring benefits to Malawi?; Removal of childbirth delivery fees: the impact on health workers in Ghana; Regulation of dual job-holding public sector doctors in Peru; Health worker responses to health sector reforms; and Motivating Tanzanian primary health care workers. [adapted from author]

How and Why Public Sector Doctors Engage in Private Practice in Potuguese-Speaking African Countries

The objective of this article is to explore the type of private practice supplementary income-generating activities of public sector doctors in the Portuguese-speaking African countries, and also to discover the motivations and the reasons why doctors have not made a complete move out of public services. [objective]

Managing Health Services in Developing Countries: Between the Ethics of the Civil Servant and the Need for Moonlighting: Managing and Moonlighting

We report on income generation and work mix among 100 civil servants who manage public health services in developing countries. Their salary puts these managers among the better-off in their countries. However, 87% of the respondents complement their salaries with other income-generating activities.

Multiple Public-Private Jobholding of Health Care Providers in Developing Countries: An Exploration of Theory and Evidence

This review examines the systemic and individual causes of multiple job holding (MJH) and evidence on its prevalence. MJH should be seen as resulting initially from underlying system-related causes. These include overly ambitious efforts by governments to develop and staff extensive delivery systems with insufficient resources. Governments have tried to use a combination of low wages, incentives, exhortations to public service, and regulation to develop these systems. In many countries, these strategies are not sufficient to outweigh the motivations of and incentives faced by individual health workers in mixed public private labour markets.

Public Sector Doctors with Second Jobs

It is common for doctors working in the public sector to hold second jobs in private practice. Dual medical practice occurs in virtually all countries regardless of income. [author’s description]

Qualitative Health Worker Study in Rwanda: a Methodology to Understand Health Worker Behavior

This presentation was part of the ECSA Workforce Observatory Meeting in Arusha. It describes an evaluative study to determine issues and causes of health worker problems and shortages done in Rwanda to aid in informing policy reform.


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Role of Regulation in Influencing Income-Generating Activities Among Public Sector Doctors in Peru

The objective of this article is to examine in Peru the nature of dual practice (doctors holding two jobs at once - usually public sector doctors with private practices), the factors that influence individuals decisions to undertake dual practice, the conditions faced when doing so and the potential role of regulatory intervention in this area. [from abstract]

Should Physicians' Dual Practice Be Limited? An Incentive Approach

We develop a principal-agent model to analyze how the behavior of a physician in the
public sector is affected by his activities in the private sector. We show that the physician will have incentives to over-provide medical services when he uses his public activity as a way of increasing his prestige as a private doctor. The health authority only benefits from the physician’s dual practice when it is interested in ensuring a very accurate treatment for the patient. Our analysis provides a theoretical framework in which some actual policies implemented to regulate physicians’ dual practice can be addressed.